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Scholarly study of these obligations has proceeded over the past half century with
development of the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR).1 In its most
widely accepted definition, CSR refers to the responsibilities of a firm to society
in four domains: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary (or philanthropic).2
Along with tobacco and alcohol producers (the ‘‘sin industries’’), weapons
manufacturers and other segments of the military arms and equipment industry
(hereafter, ‘‘defense firms’’) have been excluded from CSR research under the pre-
sumption that they violate CSR standards in the ethical domain.3 Byrne’s scathing
critique—more ideological essay than empirical analysis4—in Journal of Business
Ethics claims that defense firms would fail CSR tests through their (1) harm to
the environment, (2) violation of human rights, (3) profiteering, and (4) abuse of
political power.
This ideological bias against the social responsibility of defense firms touches on
familiar Armed Forces & Society topics, such as societal attitudes toward the
military,5 the military-industrial complex,6 and civil-military relations.7 These neg-
ative views, while focused on defense firms’ products and purposes, necessarily taint
the social standing of the several millions employed by over 19,000 firms currently
under contract to the U.S. Department of Defense.8 They can have only deleterious
spillover effects on society’s views of military members and institutions. Antimili-
tary biases are exacerbated through the military’s guilt by association with, as Byrne
puts it, these ‘‘harm-facilitating businesses.’’9 Put simply, if the firm that makes a
weapon cannot be socially responsible, how then can either the firm’s employees
or the weapon’s users be?
Further, views of defense firms as socially irresponsible reinforce—unreasonably so
because they lack nuance—fears of the military-industrial complex.10 The argument
that defense firms might serve to help accomplish legitimate state ends is countered
by the claim that industry is the dominant partner in the military-industrial complex,
deliberately promoting state belligerency for profit. Considered in this light, the clas-
sic civil-military relations issue—the proper nature and extent of civilian control of
the military—must account for defense industry with its behind-the-scenes machi-
nations and manipulations of both civil and military leadership.
Finally, this bias obscures possibilities that defense firms might take any socially
redeeming actions through, for example, community service or philanthropic
contributions. Thus, in the same way that, while some may abhor those aspects of
a soldier’s life that require him or her to kill, they will admire other aspects
(e.g., participation in the Toys for Tots program run by the Marine Corps Reserve),
might not shades and variations exist regarding the CSR of defense firms?
Treating each of these issues seriously would require more space than is available
here. In this article, we wish to provide evidence that establishes an empirical basis
for corrections or refutations of anecdotal and ideological arguments about defense
firms’ CSR. Specifically, this article presents CSR research on this neglected yet
significant11 segment of the U.S. industrial sector. Using data obtained from a survey
of managers of defense firms, it documents and analyzes their CSR orientation in
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the four domains mentioned above: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary.
It provides evidence of the extent to which and ways in which the CSR orientation
of these managers differs from those of managers in other industries, and thus also a
more nuanced perspective of the ways in which and extent to which defense firms
might actually be considered socially responsible. Ultimately, it helps to answer the
question: ‘‘Can a company that makes products that kill be socially responsible?’’12
To the extent that the social responsibility of defense firms may be redeemed, so too
may the social standing of their employees and the military be protected.
Background
Bowen’s book Social Responsibilities of the Businessman13 laid CSR foundations
with the idea that a firm’s obligations to society extend beyond its formal legal obli-
gations to operate within the law and its economic obligations (e.g., to shareholders)
to be profitable. Early CSR frameworks envisioned three potentially overlapping
domains—legal, economic, and ethical—in which a firm operates.14 The balance
among these three domains and the manner in which they overlap describe a firm’s
actions and provide insights into its orientations and priorities.
Four Domains of CSR
Carroll proposed a four-domain model of CSR, which added discretionary responsi-
bilities to the legal, economic, and ethical domains; he later renamed the discretion-
ary domain as the philanthropic domain.15 This four-domain model has been widely
used among scholars of business ethics16 as well as among firms that face societal
pressures (e.g., from governmental agencies and stakeholders) to improve their
business citizenship, while at the same time improving their business performance.17
The economic and legal domains of Carroll’s model are straightforward. The
economic domain refers to a firm’s commitments to profitability in several respects:
to maximize profits, to be consistently profitable, to maintain a strong competitive
market position, and to maintain high operating efficiencies.18 The legal domain
refers to a firm’s obligations to obey statutes and regulations and to pay taxes. As
Pinkston and Carroll note, these two domains are the foundational tiers of CSR:
‘‘If one accepts that both economic and legal responsibilities are required of business
by society, then these two factors combine to form a minimum threshold for the
corporation’s social responsibility.’’19
Inclusion of the ethical domain substantially complicates the scope of CSR, as it
attempts to capture responsibilities of a firm to conduct business in accordance with
societal norms and customs. Ethical considerations may of course be in tension with
economic considerations, and social standards vary over time and across cultures.20
Finally, the discretionary domain reflects societal expectations that firms not
merely comply with laws and norms but rather choose to contribute in socially ame-
liorative ways. Firms might participate in any number of ‘‘quality-of-life’’ activities
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such as investments in the arts, having employees participate in community chari-
ties, or assisting in educational programs.21
Stakeholder theory relates to CSR in the sense that society—in addition to
a firm’s owners, shareholders, employees, suppliers, and consumers22—becomes a
stakeholder for the firm, and society’s issues become the firm’s issues. A firm’s
particular culture is shaped as management adjudicates and balances various stake-
holders’ concerns.23 Examples include firms such as Ben and Jerry’s (ice cream),
Cafe´ Direct (coffee), and Green & Black’s (chocolate),24 which have developed
strong and explicit corporate commitments to so-called fair trade practices.25
CSR Orientation Research
Aupperle26 employed survey research to determine relativeweightings (on a ten-point
scale) for the strength ofmanagers’ CSRorientations in each of the fourCSRdomains.
His study of chief executive officers of ForbesDirectory firms revealed that they placed
the heaviest emphasis on the economic domain (with a mean of 3.50), followed by the
legal (2.54), ethical (2.22), and discretionary (1.30) domains. This study supported
Carroll’s relative weighting construct for the four domains,27 as well as the founda-
tional importance, mentioned above, of the combined economic and legal domains.
Aupperle also found that CSR orientation in the economic domain was inversely
related to that in the ethical domain, as well as to the combined three non-economic
domains. The three non-economic domains have been denoted a ‘‘concern for
society’’ category, since social responsibility is often seen as combining legal,
ethical, and discretionary concerns; high CSR orientation scores in this category
indicate a strong orientation toward social responsibility.28
Numerous academic studies of CSR orientations since 1985 have employed the
same survey methodology to examine various industry segments and populations.
These provide evidence that managers’ CSR orientations are attributable to a variety
of factors, including gender,29 race,30 firm type,31 and industry type.32
CSR and Defense Firms
An important assumption of these studies, and a key one for this article, is that a
firm’s CSR may be assessed empirically from the CSR orientations of its people
rather than by subjective moral judgments concerning its purposes, activities, or
products. None of the studies, however, included defense firms or any of the sin
industries; thus such biases seem operative.
Historically, CSR has been defined mainly as what firms do to ‘‘give something
back,’’ and industries such as tobacco and defense firms were not visible in that
movement.33 The more recent studies cited above expand CSR to include how a firm
creates wealth rather than just how it spends it. Now, previous ‘‘corporate villains’’
are claiming social responsibility, opening alternative views and causing consternation
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among some CSR purists who prefer to focus on the worst impacts of these firms’
products. As one author says of the tobacco industry:
[We may see] unscrupulous companies, very happy to sell as much as possible with
little care to the consequences . . . Alternatively, we could see a different type of com-
pany. One that seriously invests in research to develop reduced harm products. One that
manages its environmental impact carefully, and treats the people in its supply chain
with respect. One that supports and develops its own people, and which aims to
improve society through that process of ‘‘giving something back’’ . . . [A] number
of those companies are now stating that these are all things they address, or aim to
address. If we agree that it is important how these companies operate, we should wel-
come the aim and then judge them by their actions.34
Considering the social responsibility of defense firms leads to questions that require
more nuanced analysis. For example, we may ask how harmful a product must be
and for what purposes it is to be used before its producer is deemed socially irrespon-
sible. Firms like Boeing produce items for peaceful commercial use, along with
military-unique lethal weapons such as the HARPOON missile. Colt and Beretta
produce weapons not only for the military but also for law enforcement. Still others
like Raytheon produce ancillary equipment (e.g., radar and communications sys-
tems) that, while not inherently lethal, direct and enable the employment of lethal
weapons. Sikorsky helicopters may, in addition to transporting troops to battle, be
used for humanitarian relief operations. Even a Caterpillar bulldozer might be seen
as an instrument of war if employed by Israelis to demolish a Palestinian settle-
ment.35 Other defense firms provide services (e.g., consulting, managerial, logistics,
and training) rather than products; indeed, the U.S. Defense Department now spends
more for services than for materiel.36 Clearly, categorically excluding defense firms
from CSR consideration leads to a failure to account for variations and nuances in
these firms’ products and services and how they might be used.
We may also ask whether it matters, in CSR terms, that defense firms increas-
ingly design for weapons improvements that allow for more precision and control
in lethal effects (e.g., Joint Direct Attack Munition) and hence, for less harm in terms
of collateral damage.37 Nonlethal weapons also receive increased emphasis.38
We may also ask whether the rationale for any particular weapon or piece of
military gear matters when it comes to CSR. As armed forces exist to serve state
(public) ends, so do the weapons and equipment used by those forces serve those
same ends. Exclusion of defense firms from CSR consideration fails to recognize
and account for any contributions they might make to public ends (e.g., national
security). In a related vein, we may ask whether it matters that defense firms provide
their products and services under contract in response to government solicitations in
furtherance of at least nominally public purposes.39
Byrne’s critique dismisses such complications, suggesting instead that defense
firms inherently are involved in ‘‘fundamentally (not just incidentally) unethical
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activity.’’40 He argues that society fails to recognize this because of its outmoded
‘‘Westphalian’’ view of industry as a dutiful servant of the nation-state.41 From
Byrne’s post-Westphalian perspective, the boundaries between defense industry and
the state have grown indistinct, and industry interests now drive state action.42
He claims, ‘‘the primary beneficiaries of nation-state arms procurement are not
citizens needing protection but private corporations needing revenue’’ and further
that ‘‘weapons businesses are profitable only because of amoral government priori-
ties that the industry fosters and largely controls.’’43
Such claims fail to recognize that close ties must be expected when the state
depends on industry to provide means for military action.44 It is also to be expected
that defense firms would make little distinction among what is best for them, their
industry, and the nation’s national security.45 These expectations, however, do not
justify the logical leap from a legitimate alignment of interests to presumptions of
systemic unethical collusion and manipulation.
Byrne’s critique might be simply dismissed had it not appeared in a well-regarded
journal like Journal of Business Ethics.46 However, since no one has answered him,
nor have any new studies emerged to examine CSR of defense firms, his ideological
opposition to violence in any form seems to reflect the prevailing view.47 Absent
opposition, this view would continue to exclude defense firms from CSR research.
As we noted above, however, the mainstream CSR scholarship acknowledges that
an industry’s CSR is determined by the CSR orientation of its managers. Therefore,
in order to confirm or refute the conventional wisdom of excluding defense firms, we
assess the orientation of their managers and compare it to the CSR of other
industries.
CSR-Related Studies and Developments in Defense Firms
While no explicit CSR research has been accomplished in defense firms, some
related studies have addressed legal and business ethics issues, for example, in
defense procurement overcharges and fraud.48 These may be viewed as a reaction
to the ethical scandals and instances of procurement waste that occurred during the
1980s. For example, Operation Ill Wind, a U.S. investigation of procurement fraud,
led to convictions of several government officials and defense contractors.49 Several
so-called horror stories of apparently overpriced tools and parts were featured
prominently in the media.50
The Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct51 was a
CSR-related response to such cases. Thirty-two defense firms organized this
initiative in 1986 with the stated intent to govern their conduct by adopting and
implementing ‘‘a set of principles of business ethics and conduct that acknowledge
and express their federal procurement-related corporate responsibilities to the
Department of Defense, as well as to the public, the Government, and to each
other.’’52 The Initiative features include a written code of ethics, ethics training, and
internal mechanisms for reporting ethics violations, for self-governance, and for
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sharing of best practices among its now eighty five member firms. A study con-
ducted from 1988-1992 found, however, that member firms had higher instances
of ethical violations than nonmembers,53 indicating that the Initiative reflects good
intentions rather than an effective system of enforcement or compliance.54
The Electronic Industry Citizens Coalition is a more recent example of CSR-
related activity in the electronics, information, and communications technology
field. This coalition developed a code of conduct outlining standards ‘‘to ensure that
working conditions in the electronics industry supply chain are safe, that workers
are treated with respect and dignity, and that manufacturing processes are environ-
mentally responsible.’’55
CSRO of Defense Firm Managers
Such developments indicate that the managers of defense firms have concerns that
their firms operate (or are perceived to operate) in socially responsible ways, and
these concerns have not been considered in prior studies that exclude defense firms.
Thus, the CSR orientations of these managers should be assessed to determine the
extent to which they differ from those of managers in other industries and whether
such exclusions are valid.
Methodology
Such an assessment was conducted using the same survey questionnaire developed
and administered, as mentioned above, by Aupperle for his study of Forbes
executives,56 and which has been used in numerous other studies of CSR orientation.
The survey consists of twenty forced choice weighted questions with six additional
demographic questions. Each forced choice question provides a value statement and
four choices of answers to which the respondent can allocate a combined value of up
to ten points. Each answer is assigned to one of the four CSR domains as in the
example below:
It is important to perform in a manner consistent with:
___A. expectations of corporate stockholders. (economic)
___B. expectations of government and the law. (legal)
___C. the philanthropic and charitable expectations of society. (discretionary)
___D. expectations of societal mores and ethical norms. (ethical)
The study population consisted of managers of all 1,082 firms that provided
electronics equipment (specifically command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment) under contracts with the
U.S. Army’s Communications and Electronics Command Acquisition Center, Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey, during the fiscal years of 2005–2007. The values of these
contracts ranged from several thousand dollars to approximately $1 billion.
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The survey data were analyzed using SPSS 14.0. Means and standard deviations
for participant scores in each of the four CSR domains were calculated. Principal
factor analysis and four-factor, principal factor analysis with varimax rotation were
performed. Factor loadings were analyzed to determine if all four CSR domainswere
represented, and intercorrelations among the domains were analyzed. The results were
analyzed to compare the CSR orientation means of this survey with those obtained
from previous studies.
Results
The number of firms responding to the survey was 192, and after eliminating
erroneously completed or incomplete responses, 169 firms’ (15.6 percent) responses
were included in the demographic analysis and 166 (15.3 percent) in the statistical
analysis. The demographic data reveal that very small businesses (fewer than
100 employees) comprised the largest group (39.1 percent) of respondents, while
very large firms (more than 10,000 employees) represented the next largest
group (28.4 percent). Most of the firms (61.5 percent) reported deriving more
than 75 percent of their annual revenue from defense contracts. Almost half
(43.8 percent) of the firms were based solely in the United States, while almost a
third (30.8 percent) reported having locations in more than 10 countries. Regarding
membership in the previously mentioned Defense Industry Initiative and the
Electronic Industry Citizens Coalition, 13 percent reported membership in either
or both of these organizations, while 86.4 percent of respondents reported either that
their firms were not members or that they did not know their firm’s membership sta-
tus. Over 85 percent of respondents classified their positions in their firms as
‘‘senior-level manager’’ or higher, and almost 60 percent had a master’s or higher
level degree. Almost two-thirds of the respondents were over 50 years old, 84 percent
were male, and 84 percent gave their race as ‘‘white.’’
As described above, factor loadings were analyzed to determine if all four CSR
domains were represented. Factor loadings greater than or equal to .40 were consid-
ered to have high correlation with the factors. The results indicated that the four
domains were well represented by the respondents in this study; thus, defense firm
managers’ orientations do not exclude any of the four CSR domains.
Table 1 gives summary statistics, and Table 2 displays correlations. Table 3 lists
findings from twenty-three separate studies since 1982, including Aupperle’s 1981
study of Forbes Directory firms and this current study of defense firms.
In contrast to the Forbes firms, this study revealed that defense firms had
the strongest orientation to the legal domain, followed by the economic domain.
However, defense firms and the Forbes firms both reflect, as noted above, the same
emphasis on the economic and legal domains as foundational in their respective
orientations.
For defense firms, significant positive relationships exist between the economic
and legal domains, the legal and discretionary domains, the legal and ethical
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domains, and the discretionary and ethical domains. Recall from above that Forbes
firms exhibited a negative correlation between the economic and ethical domains, as
well as between the economic and the combined three non-economic domains; sim-
ilar inverse relationships were not found in defense firms. This may indicate that
these negative correlations in CSR orientations occur only when the economic
domain has the highest score.
Figure 1 depicts CSR orientation means from this study of defense firms relative
to means of groups studied in previous research. High and low values are noted,
along with the grand mean with and without the means of defense firm managers.
The mean scores of defense firm managers are higher in the legal and the ethical
domains and lower in the economic and discretionary domains. However, the means
of defense firms fall within the boundaries of high and low means of other groups,
and there is virtually no difference in the overall mean scores with and without the
current research.
Byrne’s critique leads one to believe that defense firm managers’ CSR orienta-
tions would be significantly different than those of other firms. In particular, he
suggests that defense firms are highly motivated by profits and little concerned
with societal welfare. Accordingly, one might hypothesize that defense firm
managers’ CSR orientation (1) in the economic domain should be higher than
that of other firms and (2) their combined CSR orientation in the other three
non-economic (i.e., concern for society) domains should be lower than that of other
firms.
The data provide evidence to the contrary. One-sample t-tests (alpha ¼ .05) were
performed to compare the CSR orientation means of defense firm managers to those
of the Forbes managers79 and to the grand mean of all other groups from Table 3.
The results reveal that the CSR orientation of defense firm managers in:
Table 1. Summary Statistics: CSR Orientations of Defense Firm Managers
Domain N Min Max M SD
Economic 166 .00 8.85 3.0334 1.12033
Legal 166 .80 9.35 3.2383 .82316
Discretionary 166 .00 8.20 1.2001 .88671
Ethical 166 .35 9.35 2.5019 .96225
Table 2. Correlations (**p < .01): CSR Orientations of Defense Firm Managers
Domain Economic Legal Discretionary Ethical
Economic 1.000
Legal .202** 1.000
Discretionary .045 .225** 1.000
Ethical .084 .473** .520** 1.000
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(1) the economic domain (M ¼ 3.03, SD¼ 1.12) is significantly lower than that of
the Forbes managers (t(165) ¼ 5.37, p < .001) and significantly lower than
that of all other groups (t(165) ¼ 3.76, p < .001);
(2) the average of the combined non-economic domains (M ¼ 2.31, SD ¼ 1.23) is
significantly higher than that of Forbes managers (t(165)¼ 3.08, p¼ .001) and,
while higher than that of all other groups, not significantly so (t(165) ¼ 1.547,
p ¼ .059).
Thus, while the CSR orientations of defense and nondefense managers differ, the
differences provide evidence that defense managers may actually have stronger
Table 3. Mean Scores of CSR Orientation Studies for Comparison
Population Economic Legal Ethical Discretionary
1981 Forbes Annual Directory57 3.50 2.54 2.22 1.30
Business Students58 2.75 2.59 2.75 1.74
Top Managers from Standard & Poor’s Register59 3.92 2.62 2.33 1.12
Insider Directors60 3.28 2.62 2.21 1.83
Outsider Directors61 3.77 2.50 2.08 1.31
German Chemical and Allied Products Industry
Chief Executive Officers/General Managers62
2.86 3.21 2.46 1.42
Swiss Chemical and Allied Products Industry Chief
Executive Officers/General Managers63
3.11 3.04 2.70 1.10
Swedish Chemical and Allied Products Industry
Chief Executive Officers/General Managers64
3.27 3.30 2.43 1.00
U.S. Chemical and Allied Products Industry Chief
Executive Officers/General Managers65
3.31 2.96 2.48 1.19
Japanese Chemical and Allied Products Industry
Chief Executive Officers/General Managers66
3.34 2.76 2.42 1.41
U.K. Chemical and Allied Products Industry Chief
Executive Officers/General Managers67
3.49 3.15 2.29 0.98
French Chemical and Allied Products Industry
Chief Executive Officers/General Managers68
3.60 3.04 2.35 0.98
Undergraduate Business Students–U.S69 2.70 2.48 2.59 1.33
Undergraduate Business Students–Hong Kong70 3.02 2.32 2.33 1.88
USA Managers Enrolled in MBA Program71 3.69 2.87 2.02 1.23
French Managers Enrolled in MBA Program72 3.97 2.64 1.86 1.51
Accountant Students–U.S.73 3.11 2.68 2.37 1.68
Practicing Accountants74 3.78 2.74 2.13 1.18
High Religiousness Students75 2.75 2.66 2.70 1.85
Low Religiousness Students76 3.03 2.75 2.46 1.75
High Religiousness Managers77 3.81 2.67 2.06 1.45
Low Religiousness Managers78 3.85 2.71 2.01 1.32
Defense Firm Managers (this study) 3.03 3.24 2.50 1.20
Mean of all studies 3.35 2.79 2.34 1.38
Mean without this study of defense firms 3.36 2.77 2.33 1.39
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orientations to social responsibility than the general population of private sector
managers.
Discussion
Overall, these results contradict the notion that defense firms have weak CSR. What
accounts for the differences in the CSR orientations of defense and other firms?
The Legal Domain
The largest mean score difference is in the legal domain between defense firms
(M ¼ 3.24) and the Forbes firms (M ¼ 2.54), as well as between defense firms
(M ¼ 3.24) and all other groups studied (M ¼ 2.77) (from Table 3). Probably the
most important factor in this difference is the requirement for defense firms to oper-
ate under and comply with the provisions of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, a requirement not levied
on firms that conduct usual commercial contracting. The Federal Acquisition
Regulation governs all federal contracting, and with the Defense Supplement, all
defense contracting.80 As federal regulations, they have the force and effect of law.81
They contain detailed requirements and constraints covering all aspects of the con-
tracting process, including solicitations, proposals, vendor selections, contract
awards, and contract administration. A few of the myriad areas addressed in the
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Figure 1. Comparison of defense firms’ CSR orientation with other studies
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methods of contracting, types of contracts, labor laws, occupational safety, energy
conservation, environmental protection, cost accounting standards, and contract
financing. It even requires that a ‘‘Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct’’
(Subpart 3.10) be included as a clause in contracts over $5M or 120 days in duration.
These regulations create a complex of intricate and often arcane rules with which
defense firms must comply but which are of no concern to firms that conduct busi-
ness solely in the commercial sector. Thus, it is unsurprising that managers of
defense firms would have a substantially greater focus on and orientation toward the
legal domain of CSR.
In 2005, the Government Accountability Office convened a forum of industry
leaders to assess the state of the national industrial base for government contract-
ing.82 One of the major complaints that emerged from this forum was the complexity
and burdensome nature of the rules surrounding the federal acquisition process.
In such an environment, the risks of noncompliance (e.g., being disqualified from
a contracting action and unfavorable media attention) may outweigh the rewards
from the contract. Risk-averse attitudes and approaches thus prevail, again reflecting
a concern for the legal domain among managers of defense firms, one that is not
necessarily prevalent in other firms.
Third, and again reflecting the same concerns with rules, the orientations of
defense firm managers in the legal domain exceeded that of the economic domain.
This is not necessarily an unusual result, however, as Table 3 indicates two other such
cases (i.e., chemical industry firms in Sweden and Germany) of industry segments
subject to extensive regulation and oversight. In such cases, it might be expected that
the legal component of CSR would compete with the economic component.
The Economic Domain
Defense firms’ mean orientation in the economic domain (M¼ 3.03) was lower than
that of the Forbes firms (M ¼ 3.50) and lower than the average of groups in all
studies (M ¼ 3.36). One possible explanation for this outcome is found in the
monopsonistic (i.e., one buyer, many sellers) conditions under which defense firms
operate.83 The federal government has a public policy interest in maintaining a
healthy industrial base of many suppliers, ranging from major defense firms to small
and disadvantaged businesses.84 The Federal Acquisition Regulation contains provi-
sions for contracts to be set aside for small and disadvantaged businesses precisely to
promote socioeconomic policy interests.85 Further, members of Congress are often
perceived as sponsoring legislative earmarks that lead to directed defense contracts
to their constituencies.86 These factors create an environment that assures at least a
minimally robust business base and thus serves to reduce economic risks for defense
firms to levels lower than those faced by their purely commercial counterparts.
Economic risks for defense firms are also mitigated by the twenty-three regula-
tory references to ‘‘fair and reasonable’’ costs or prices. While these help guard
against contractor profiteering, they also cut the other way to provide a measure
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of financial security for contractors; again, an advantage not enjoyed by purely com-
mercial firms.
Despite its lower score, managers of defense firms still asserted the economic
domain’s importance, as evidenced by comments by survey respondents. One man-
ager explained, ‘‘The purpose of business is to make a profit and meet its fiduciary
obligations to owners (stockholders). It is not to provide jobs or give ‘goodwill’ to
others in the form of jobs/positions/ welfare/support of the arts, etc.’’ Another exec-
utive stated, ‘‘The burden of outside financial pressures in the form of federal, state,
and local taxes and fees eats excessively into whatever profit may be gained.’’
Finally, another executive complained, ‘‘Between the recent fuel price rise and
increase in taxes, businesses are hard pressed to make a profit.’’ These comments
reflect on-going concerns for profitability in the face of current economic and
financial pressures.
The Ethical Domain
Considering past exclusions of defense firms from CSR research, perhaps the
most surprising finding is that the ethical domain score for managers of these firms
(M ¼ 2.50) exceeded that of the Forbes firms (M ¼ 2.22) and that of all groups stud-
ied (M ¼ 2.33). Several explanations may account for this finding. First, despite
Byrne’s assertions, defense firm managers may truly see their businesses as fulfilling
some higher public purpose such as enhancing national security. Second, their sen-
sitivity to ethical issues may be heightened due to past wrongdoing by defense firms.
(Recall the Defense Industry Initiative and Electronic Industry Citizens Coalition were
formed in reaction to such abuses.) Third, the Federal Acquisition Regulation intends
explicitly to promote ethical practices in federal contracting; it contains ninety-five
references to either ‘‘ethics’’ or ‘‘ethical.’’ Many of its requirements (e.g., process
transparency) contribute to an environment that, at least nominally and to some
extent substantively, serves to curb wrongdoing and promotes ethical behaviors.
Managers of defense firms who are focused on complying with the regulations will
thus naturally perceive such compliance as inherently constituting ethical behavior.
The Discretionary Domain
The CSR orientations for defense firm managers in the discretionary (philanthropic)
domain (M ¼ 1.20) were lower than that of the Forbes firms (M ¼ 1.30) and other
groups (M ¼ 1.39). At least two explanations may account for this result. First, the
Federal Acquisition Regulation contains specific rules concerning both the allow-
able costs that a firm may charge to the government and the profit a firm may earn
on a contract. Regarding contract costs, for example, ‘‘[c]ontributions or donations,
including cash, property and services, regardless of recipient, are unallowable . . . ’’
and that only ‘‘[c]osts of participation in community service activities (e.g., blood
bank drives, charity drives, savings bond drives, disaster assistance, etc.)’’ are
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allowed.87 Regarding profit, regulations require the government to adopt ‘‘a struc-
tured approach’’ and to use accepted profit guidelines to develop a prenegotiation
profit or fee objective for its contracts.88 That is, a defense firm, unlike its purely
commercial counterpart, may not simply charge what it believes the market will
bear. Rather, its profits are in large measure determined by the government. Such
regulations obviously restrict defense firms’ abilities to make charitable donations
and take other discretionary/philanthropic actions; hence their lower CSR score in
the discretionary domain.
Second, many aspects of federal contracting under the Federal Acquisition
Regulation contain features that purely commercial firms may consider discretion-
ary. Policy provisions concerning small and disadvantaged businesses are a good
example. While a commercial firm might decide, as a discretionary goodwill action,
to sponsor minority scholarships, regulations promote such actions as matters of
public policy. As noted above, socioeconomic policies are promoted through, for
example, the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program, Indian
Incentive Program, Small Business Administration, Small Business Administration
8(a) contractors, small business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled
veterans, women-owned small business, historically black colleges and universities,
and minority institutions in federal procurement programs. Thus, the Federal
Acquisition Regulation and U.S. policy include something of an implicit CSR
framework. Operating within that framework, defense firm managers naturally see
compliance with rules as accomplishing at least some of their discretionary CSR.
Summary
We conclude that the overall CSR orientations of defense firm managers are not sub-
stantially different from that of other managers. The relatively minor differences that
do exist are attributable to moderating factors, such as regulatory requirements, that
create a unique managerial environment for defense firm managers. In this environ-
ment, defense firmmanagers perceive theCSRdomains (economic, legal, ethical, and
discretionary) differently than their nondefense counterparts.Whatmay be a question
of legal compliance for a defense firm manager may be question of discretion for her
nondefense counterpart. Economic considerations for defense firm managers are
moderated by the government’s policies that help ensure they earn a fair and reason-
able profit. Discretionary actions are moderated by the government’s restrictions on
allowable costs. Given these findings, we may hypothesize that differences in CSR
between defense firms and firms in other industries are attributable to differences
in the extent and nature of regulation and oversight between the industries.
Revisiting Byrne’s Critique
Recall that Byrne locates the main problem with defense industry in its abuse of
political power in promoting and facilitating violence for profit. In terms of the CSR
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domains, he sees its drive for profits in the economic domain as insufficiently tem-
pered either by legal considerations (because industry exercises undue control over
the state) or by ethical considerations (because of theWestphalian myth that industry
is merely a servant of legitimate state ends).89 Byrne’s view is however not sup-
ported by this article’s analysis of defense firm managers, who report a fairly
balanced CSR orientation—one with a robust ethical component—not substantially
different from other industry managers. The most obvious explanation for this dis-
crepancy is that defense managers simply would not agree with Byrne’s assessment
of the nature of the problem, or for that matter, whether a problem actually exists.
Nevertheless, Byrne’s arguments contain at least a kernel of validity; that is, some
U.S. defense firms and their managers no doubt suffer from moral failings. Of
course, abuses by individual firms should not condemn the whole industry. But the
nature of these failings and the extent to which they are widespread might be
revealed through further CSR research. Thus, it is important that CSR scholars pur-
sue further studies of defense firms rather than continuing to exclude them.
Conclusion
This study contributes to the body of literature concerning CSR in the United States,
with findings that are largely consistent with existing literature. It provides a base-
line for CSR orientations for defense firms, permitting comparison with those in
other industries. This study demonstrates that a company that makes ‘‘products that
can kill’’ also exhibits similar social responsibility tendencies as other industries.
Against ideologically based claims to the contrary, it provides empirical support that
a defense firm may indeed be considered as socially responsible. Armed with this
knowledge, scholars and business practitioners should welcome defense firms to the
world of CSR research and practice.
Notes
1. See, for example, W. Acar, K. E. Aupperle, and R. M. Lowy, ‘‘An Empirical Exploration
of Measures of Social Responsibility across the Spectrum of Organizational Types,’’
International Journal of Organizational Analysis 9, 1 (2001): 26-58; B. K. Burton,
J. Farh, and W. H. Hegarty, ‘‘A Cross-Cultural Comparison of Corporate Social Respon-
sibility Orientation: Hong Kong vs. United States Students,’’ Teaching Business Ethics
4 (2000): 151-67; V. C. Edmondson and A. B. Carroll, ‘‘Giving Back: An Examination
of the Philanthropic Motivations, Orientations, and Activities of Large Black-Owned
Businesses,’’ Journal of Business Ethics 19, April (1999): 171-80; N. A. Ibrahim and
J. P. Angelidis, ‘‘The Corporate Social Responsiveness Orientation of Board Members:
Are there Differences between Inside and Outside Directors?’’ Journal of Business Ethics
14 (1995): 405-10; N. A. Ibrahim and J. P. Angelidis, ‘‘Effect of Board Members’ Gender
on Corporate Social Responsiveness Orientation,’’ Journal of Applied Business Research
10, 1 (1994): 35-43; N. A. Ibrahim and J. P. Angelidis, ‘‘Corporate Social Responsibility:
A Comparative Analysis of Perceptions of Top Executives and Business Students,’’ The
618 Armed Forces & Society 38(4)
Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business 29 (1993): 303-15; T. S. Pinkston and A. B. Carroll,
‘‘Corporate Citizenship Perspectives and Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.’’ Journal
of Business Ethics 13 (1994): 157-70.
2. A. B. Carroll, ‘‘A Three Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance,’’
Journal of Business Ethics 15 (1979): 927-39.
3. E. F. Byrne, ‘‘Assessing Arms Makers’ Corporate Social Responsibility,’’ Journal of
Business Ethics 74 (2007): 201-17; A. P. Mayer-Sommer and A. Roshwalb ‘‘An Exam-
ination of the Relationship between Ethical Behavior, Espoused Ethical Values, and
Financial Performance in the U.S. Defense Industry: 1988–1992,’’ Journal of Business
Ethics 15, December (1996): 1249-74.
4. The essay’s ideological bent is revealed in such phrases as the ‘‘monarchial domination’’
sought by the executive branch post-9/11 (p. 210); Americans’ ‘‘moral blindness’’ (p.
212) to and the ‘‘blood-drenched reality’’ (p. 213) of defense firms’ guilt; and the firms
as ‘‘facilitators of death and destruction’’ (p. 217).
5. See, for example, David R. Segal and John D. Blair, ‘‘Public Confidence in the U.S.
Military,’’ Armed Forces & Society 3, 1 (1976): 3-11.
6. Wesley J. Yordon, ‘‘The Military-Industrial Complex: A Historical Perspective,’’ Armed
Forces & Society 9, 2 (1983): 348-50; S. Melman, Pentagon Capitalism: The Political
Economy of War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970); Robert Mandel, ‘‘The Transformation
of the American Defense Industry: Corporate Perceptions and Preferences,’’ Armed
Forces & Society 20, 2 (1994): 175-97.
7. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The
Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
8. Defense Contract Management Agency, ‘‘About Us,’’ accessed September 20, 2010,
from http://www.dcma.mil/about.cfm.
9. Byrne, Assessing Arms Makers, 202.
10. C. W. Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford, 1956); D. Eisenhower, ‘‘Farewell
Address,’’ in the Annals of America: 1961–1968: The Burdens of World Power, Vol. 18
(Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1968): 1–5; Melman, Pentagon Capitalism: The
Political Economy of War.
11. Outlays for national defense in the U.S. exceed $700B in 2010 (Comptroller, U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2010), accessed September
20, 2010, from http://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget2010.html.
12. M. Baker, ‘‘Can Companies that Make Products that Kill Be Socially Responsible?’’
Business Respect 86 (September 18, 2005), accessed August 20, 2010, from http://
www.mallenbaker.net/csr/CSRfiles/ page.php?Story_ID ¼ 1492.
13. H. Bowen, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman (New York: Harper & Row, 1953).
14. M. S. Schwartz and A. B. Carroll, ‘‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-Domain
Approach,’’ Business Ethics Quarterly 13 (2003): 503-30; Carroll, A Three Dimensional
Conceptual Model, 927-39.
15. A. B. Carroll, ‘‘The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral
Management of Organizational Stakeholders,’’ Business Horizons 34, 4 (1991): 240-46.
Halpern and Snider 619
16. See, for example, M. B. Clarkson, ‘‘A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and
Evaluating Corporations,’’ Academy of Management Review 20, 1 (1995), 92-118;
A. Lockett, J. Moon, and W. Visser, ‘‘Corporate Social Responsibility in Management
Research: Focus, Nature, Salience and Sources of Influence.’’ Journal of Management
Studies 43 (2006): 115-36.
17. J. Logston and P. Lewellyn, ‘‘Expanding Accountability to Stakeholders: Trends and
Predictions,’’ Business and Society Review 105, 4 (2000): 419-35.
18. Milton Friedman and others have argued that a firm’s only proper concern is shareholder
value; all other concerns (e.g., philanthropic) are detractors. See Milton Friedman,
‘‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits,’’ New York Times
Magazine, September 13, 1970; and David Henderson, ‘‘The Case Against ‘Corporate
Social Responsibility,’’’ Policy 17, 2 (2001): 28.
19. T. S. Pinkston and A. B. Carroll, ‘‘A Retrospective Examination of CSR Orientations:
Have they Changed?’’ Journal of Business Ethics 15 (1996): 199-206.
20. See, for example, K. B. DeTienne and L. W. Lewis, ‘‘The Pragmatic and Ethical Barriers
to Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: The Nike Case,’’ Journal of Business
Ethics 60 (2005): 359-76 on the issue of Nike’s use of ‘‘slave labor of young Asian
women’’ (p. 361) to build its corporate fortune in the 1990s).
21. See, for example, P. A. Argenti, ‘‘Collaborating with Activists: How Starbucks Works
with NGOS,’’ California Management Review 47, 1 (2004): 91-116 on Starbucks’
community activities.
22. L. M. Fairfax, ‘‘The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on
Corporate Norms,’’ Journal of Corporate Law 31 (2006): 675-718; R. E. Freeman,
‘‘The Politics of Stakeholders’ Theory: Some FutureDirections,’’Business Ethics Quarterly
4 (1994): 409-21.
23. R. A. Buchholz and S. B. Rosenthal, ‘‘Stakeholder Theory and Public Policy: How
Governments Matter,’’ Journal of Business Ethics 51, May (2004): 143-53.
24. J. M. Balmer, K. Fukukawa, and E. R. Gray, ‘‘The Nature and Management of Ethical
Corporate Identity: ACommentary onCorporate Identity, Corporate Social Responsibility
and Ethics,’’ Journal of Business Ethics 76, 1 (2007): 7-15.
25. A. Nicholls and C. Opal, Fair Trade: Market-Driven Ethical Consumption (London:
Sage, 2005).
26. K. E. Aupperle, ‘‘An Empirical Inquiry into the Social Responsibilities as Defined by
Corporations: An Examination of various Models and Relationships’’ (PhD dissertation,
University of Georgia): Dissertations & Theses: Full Text database (Publication No. AAT
8225168, accessed February 5, 2008).
27. Carroll, A Three Dimensional Conceptual Model, 499.
28. K. Aupperle, A. Carroll, and J. Hattfield, ‘‘An Empirical Examination of the Relationship
between Corporate Social Responsibility and Profitability,’’ Academy of Management
Journal 28, June (1985): 458.
29. Ibrahim and Angelidis, Effect of Board Members’ Gender, 35-43; W. J. Smith and
R. S. Blackburn, ‘‘A Psychometric Examination of a Measurement Instrument’’ Proceed-
ings of the Southern Management Association, 1988); W. J. Smith and others, ‘‘An
620 Armed Forces & Society 38(4)
Examination of the Influence of Diversity and Stakeholder Role on Corporate Social
Orientation,’’ Business and Society 40 (2001): 266-95.
30. Edmondson and Carroll, Giving Back: An Examination of the Philanthropic Motivations,
171-80; Smith and others, An Examination of the Influence of Diversity, 266-95.
31. Acar, Aupperle, and Lowy, An Empirical Exploration of Measures, 26-58.
32. A. Bhambri and J. Sonnenfeld, ‘‘Organization Structure and Corporate Social Perfor-
mance: A Field Study in Two Contrasting Industries,’’ Academy of Management Journal
31, September (1988): 642-62; M. Chand, ‘‘The Relationship between Corporate Social
Performance and Corporate Financial Performance: Industry Type as a Boundary
Condition,’’ The Business Review, Cambridge 5, 1 (2006): 240-46; L. D. Lerner and
G. E. Fryxell, ‘‘An Empirical Study of the Predictors of Corporate Social Performance,’’
Journal of Business Ethics 7, December (1988): 951-59.
33. Baker, Can Companies that make Products that Kill be Socially Responsible?
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Improved Knowledge of DOD Service
Contracts could Reveal Significant Savings (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 2003).
37. A. Humphrey, J. See, and D. Faulkner, ‘‘A Methodology to Assess Lethality and
Collateral Damage for Nonfragmenting Precision-Guided Weapons,’’ ITEA Journal 29,
(2008): 411-19.
38. R. Skaggs, ‘‘Exploiting Technical Opportunities to Capture Advanced Capabilities for
our Soldiers,’’ Army AL&T, (2007): 16.
39. S. Arrowsmith, ‘‘Public Procurement as an Instrument of Public Policy and the Impact of
Market Liberalization.’’ Law Review Quarterly 111, April (1995): 235-84; K. Snider,
‘‘Defense Acquisition’s Public Policy Imprint,’’ in Management of Defense Acquisition
Projects, eds. R. Rendon and K. Snider (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics
and Astronautics, 2008): 17-34; K. Snider and R. Rendon, ‘‘Public Procurement
Policy: Implications for Theory and Practice,’’ Journal of Public Procurement 8, 3 (2008):
285-308.
40. Byrne, Assessing Arms Makers, 202. He also charges the DOD with corruption and
incompetence in overseeing and managing contracts with defense firms (p. 211).
41. We note here that ‘‘just war’’ analyses are irrelevant in Byrne’s view since the means for
war must be acquired prior to the onset of war, whether just or unjust.
42. This view invalidates application of principal-agent theories in government-industry
dealings (Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The
Principal-Agent Model [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002]).
43. Byrne, Assessing Arms Makers, 202.
44. Yordon, The Military-Industrial Complex, 348-50.
45. Mandel, The Transformation of the American Defense Industry, 193.
46. Journal of Business Ethics (JBE) is one of 40 journals used by Financial Times in deter-
mining business school research rankings, accessed September 10, 2010, from http://
www.springer.com/socialþsciences/appliedþethics/journal/10551.
Halpern and Snider 621
47. Byrne has a more recent latest JBE paper that elaborates his views of American defense
industry’s immorality. See Edmund Byrne, ‘‘The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex is
Circumstantially Unethical,’’ Journal of Business Ethics 95, 2 (2010): 153-65.
48. See, for example, N.Kurland, ‘‘TheDefense Industry Initiative: Ethics, Self-Regulation, and
Accountability,’’ Journal of Business Ethics 12 (1993): 137-45; R. Mokhiber, ‘‘Military
Overcharges,’’MultinationalMonitor 24, 10 (2003): 30; P. Lansing andK.Burkard, ‘‘Ethics
and the Defense Procurement System,’’ Journal of Business Ethics 10 (1991): 357-64.
49. J. Pegnato, ‘‘Procureosclerosis,’’ National Contract Management Journal 26, 2 (1995):
65-76.
50. As noted in J. R. Fox, The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons Acquisition
(Boston: Harvard Business School, 1988). Legal and ethical violations are of course not
unique to defense firms, as the high-profile scandals at Enron and AIG attest.
51. K. Penska and K. V. Thai, ‘‘Regulation vs. Self-Governed Compliance in Government
Procurement: The Perceived Impact of DII,’’ Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting,
& Financial Management 12 (2000): 462-96.
52. Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct, ‘‘Preamble,’’ accessed
February 21, 2008, from http://www.dii.org/Statement.htm.
53. Mayer-Sommer and Roshwalb, An Examination of the Relationship, 1249-74.
54. Kurland, The Defense Industry Initiative, 137-45.
55. Electronic Industry Citizens Coalition, ‘‘EICC Membership,’’ accessed April 5, 2008,
from http://www.eicc.info /membership.html.
56. Aupperle, An Empirical Inquiry into the Social Responsibilities.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibrahim and Angelidis, Corporate Social Responsibility, 303-15.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibrahim and Angelidis, The Corporate Social Responsiveness, 405-10.
61. Ibid.







69. Burton, Farh, and Hegarty, A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 151-67.
70. Ibid.
71. N. Ibrahim and F. Parsa, ‘‘Corporate Social Responsiveness Orientation: Are There
Differences between U.S. and French Managers?’’ Review of Business 26, 1 (2005): 27-33.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. N. Ibrahim, J. Angelidis, and D. Howard, ‘‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Compara-
tiveAnalysis of Perceptions of PracticingAccountants andAccounting Students,’’ Journal
of Business Ethics 66 (2006): 157-67.
622 Armed Forces & Society 38(4)
75. Ibid.
76. N. Ibrahim, D. Howard, and J. Angelidis,’’ The Relationship between Religiousness and
Corporate Social Responsibility Orientation: Are there Differences between Business
Managers and Students?’’ Journal of Business Ethics 78, March (2008): 165-74.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Some defense firms are of course in the Forbes Directory.
80. General Services Administration, ‘‘Federal Acquisition Regulation,’’ accessed September
20, 2010, from https://www. acquisition.gov/far/.
81. R. Pierce, Administrative Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2007).
82. Government Accountability Office, Managing the Supplier Base in the 21st Century
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006).
83. Described in Fox, The Defense Management Challenge, 300-301.
84. Department of Commerce, ‘‘Industrial Base Programs,’’ Bureau of Industry and Security,
accessed September 20, 2010, from http://www.bis.doc.gov.
85. See parts 19 and 26.
86. See Fox, The Defense Management Challenge, 38-39.
87. Parts 31.205–8 and 31.205–1(e)(3)).
88. D. Oyer, Pricing and Cost Accounting, 2nd ed. (Reston, VA: Management Concepts,
2005).
89. Discretionary/philanthropic considerations do not come into play in his analysis.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Bios
Barton H. Halpern is a senior Army civilian and serves as the Technology Lead for the Joint
Service Small Arms Program Office, Picatinny, New Jersey. He holds the highest level of
Department of Defense professional certification in Systems Planning, Research, Develop-
ment and Engineering and in Program Management. His past Army positions include
Business Transformation Chief for the Program Executive Office (Command Control
Communications Tactical) and Deputy Project Manager for Tactical Radio Communications
Systems. He received his PhD in Organization and Management from Capella University, an
MS in Technology Management from the Stevens Institute of Technology, and a BS in
Mechanical Engineering, University of Hartford.
Keith F. Snider is Associate Professor of Public Administration and Management in the
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
Halpern and Snider 623
California, where he teaches courses related to defense acquisition. His PhD is from the
Center for Public Administration & Policy at Virginia Tech. His current research interests are
in public procurement policy and public service professionalism. His publications appear in
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, Journal of Public Procurement, American
Review of Public Administration, Administration & Society, Administrative Theory & Praxis,
Acquisition Review Quarterly, and Project Management Journal.
624 Armed Forces & Society 38(4)
